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Next week will definitely be a culmination for Ukraine’s foreign policy, given the imperatives of its true course for
the next few years. Here I mean, first of all, the "return of the Ukrainian-American relations to a constructive
straight", as Ukrainian and U.S. diplomats put it. In other words, the issues to be addressed include further
development of the Ukraine - NATO relations, as well as Ukraine’s strategic partnership with Russia (Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov will visit Kyiv on May 19 and 20).
The top issue that may be affected by all of the above and will, in its turn, affect other developments is what sort of a
decision will the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine approve regarding the possible contribution of
the Ukrainian military force to take part in stabilization activities in Iraq, how will that decision be motivated, how
will it be pulled through the parliament and what sort of consequences will it have.
The issue was in the spotlight of tripartite Ukrainian-Polish-American consultations at the level of deputy foreign
ministers in Kyiv on May 13, and of the meeting of the Ukrainian-American Foreign Policy Committee on the next
day.
Today none of the interested parties - Kyiv, Washington or Warsaw - hides the existence of the proposal made by
the United States to the Ukrainian leaders to send a military unit to Iraq so that it would participate in the
stabilization operation of the Coalition, earlier known as the coalition "for disarming Saddam Hussein", led by the
USA and the UK. It was announced in Warsaw in early May that the Ukrainian force is invited to the so-called
"Polish zone of responsibility" in Iraq. The possibility was first discussed after the meeting of the Coalition
representatives in London on April 30.
Second assistant to the Undersecretary of State Stephen Pifer said on April 14 in Kyiv that Ukraine could make a
very important contribution to the creation of the stabilization forces in Iraq and the implementation of projects of
the post-war reconstruction of that country (Interfax-Ukraina, May 14, 2003). Ukraine has a number of capacities
that could be useful for Iraq, the American diplomat said, referring to the experience of the Ukrainian-Polish
battalion and the cooperation between the Ukrainian and American military. It Washington D.C. is has been also
stressed that Ukraine is among the countries that had preliminary agreed to send their military units to Iraq. By the
way, such a commitment was made earlier by Azerbaijan and Georgia. At an international conference in Warsaw on
May 22-23 the participants will discuss a more detailed plan of Ukraine’s possible involvement in the operation in
Iraq.
Ukrainian Foreign Ministers Anatoly Zlenko said in Kyiv on May 15 that the decision to send the Ukrainian troops
to Iraq would be approved within the next 7-10 days (Interfax-Ukraina, May 15, 2003). The Foreign Ministry argues
that such a decision meets Ukraine’s national interests.
Some time before support for such a decision was voiced by Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council
Yevhen Marchuk.
The Ukrainian expert circles view the situation as a chance that must not be missed. The chance, if used properly,
may contribute to normalizing the relations between Ukraine and the United States and the UK that has been
damaged by the last year scandal over the approval by the Ukrainian top leadership of a possibility to sell the
"Kolchuga" radar systems to Iraq. Today the situation with "Kolchugas" is remembered in Washington as if saying
that "nothing has been forgotten, but it’s not a proper time to talk about that". Furthermore, the "Iraq chance" makes
it possible for Kyiv to announce itself as a subject of global politics. That possibility was lost with the beginning of
the "tape" scandal and almost completely buried by the "Kolchuga" case. In this context, one may regard a likely
decision of the executive branch and the parliament to send the Ukrainian troops to Iraq as a step towards "Euro-
Atlantic integration" of Ukraine, i.e., the movement aiming at joining NATO - if not very soon, than in the medium
run. The chance that Ukraine has received nowadays may be compared to that received by Romania and Bulgaria in
1999, when they fully supported the NATO operation against Yugoslavia and received favorable attitude when the
possibility of inviting them to join NATO was discussed. The difference, though, is that NATO so far has not been
involved in Iraq. The decision to get involved, according to NATO Secretary General George Robertson, has not
been taken yet. On the other hand, there is not doubt that NATO will overcome the current "Transatlantic gap"
between "continental Europe" and the USA. Furthermore, the stabilization operation in Iraq is likely to come under
NATO control in the near future. Probably that will be the first example of "NATO’s new face". In that case it is
likely that the U.S. will respond to a conscious and politically risky decision of the Ukrainian leadership by
supporting not a broader and deeper cooperation with Ukraine, but Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Therefore, the
Ukrainian political establishment - that so far has followed Lenin’s principle of "one step forward, two steps back" -
will have to make its European integration policy more clear and will have to make unequivocal political statement
that will leave no room for phrases like "it’s too early today to apply".
Therefore, the decision to send the Ukrainian unit to Iraq may be seen as a step towards creating an atmosphere in
which such an application "to NATO" may be considered with support of the world’s most influential state. Other
conditions that would help a positive reaction to such an application were enumerated at a recent conference in
Washington by Yevhen Marchuk: implementation of the Action Plan, fulfilling the benchmarks for 2003, and
achieving support of the majority of the population. The conference, by the way, reflected a generally positive
inclination of representatives of the NATO member states to have a frank dialogue with Ukraine - a political
dialogue included.
Summing up, one may say that this time geopolitics, geostrategy and geography do not overlap, and Ukraine has
received a chance to come closer to its cherished "European space" through the USA by means of showing itself
properly in Iraq. Moreover, the issue today is in fact the creation of a new transatlantic bridge in which the link
between Poland and Ukraine will play a role of one of the pillars. The Iraq experience in creation of that bridge
promises to not to be the last effort. By the way, it is repeated off the record in Kyiv that Poland will not be able to
satisfy its newest ambitions without using Ukraine’s potential. Hence, Ukraine is facing the need to engage in a
smart and careful diplomatic game that can be a component of success.
The risks nowadays can be seen in several spheres at a time. On the one hand, it is the fact that the Ukrainian
population does not perceive the war as a due cause, while the war itself is hard to explain in generally accepted
categories of morals and international law. On the other hand, participation of Ukrainian soldiers in the stabilization
force in Iraq cannot be seen as a kind of vacation for them. The operation promises to be more difficult than peace-
keeping efforts in the Balkans - particularly taking into account the factor of the territory populated by the Kurds.
The Kurds, who life on the territory to be included in the so-called "Polish zone of responsibility", fully supported
the war. However, Kurds of Iraq and Turkey, the ally state of the USA, demand the creation of their own state. The
circumstance adds dangerous intrigue to the general situation. Ukraine’s legislation does not have a precedent; the
current laws do not envisage sending troops abroad under such circumstances. Therefore, the political decision
demands either violation of the law or changing the law as soon as possible. Iraq today does not have a central
authority that could be a party in negotiations with Ukraine about inviting its military troops for deployment in the
country. Yet, both Ukrainian law-makers and executive officials believe that the decision to send troops to Iraq will
be able to collect the necessary number of supporting votes if brought to the parliament for approval. The
discussions of the quality and quantity of the Ukrainian unit and the way it is going to be funded have just begun.
The United States has already sent a preliminary list of specific questions, and some of them have been already
provided with similarly preliminary answers. So far it is only known to date that, according to Yevhen Marchuk, the
Ukrainian unit will not participate in policing operations in Iraq (the Den’, May 12, 2003).
Pluses of the decision that is likely to be approved in Kyiv these days are not only in strategic movement of
Ukrainian politics, but also in the near business prospects. Ukrainian companies may gain access to participation in
projects of post-war reconstruction of Iraq’s economy, access to Iraq oil and possibilities to get involved in its
transportation through the Odessa-Brody route, as well as regaining its positions in the once familiar market and the
restoration of trade. The decision to send the chemical protection battalion to Iraq has already - as some U.S.
diplomats hinted - brought Ukrainian companies closer to prospects of participation in Iraq projects as
subcontractors. Next step may bring Ukraine even closer to success. However, one may remember that at some point
Ukraine "successfully" missed chances to make money on the post-war reconstruction in Bosnia or Kosovo. One
should also keep in mind that there will be always the question about the price for getting contracts in Iraq.
BY al means, one should not forget about the "Russian factor". Russia, whose companies have serious interests in
Iraq, is hardly interested in having a new competitor, even the one of a different "weight category". Today Moscow
will try, on the one hand, to bring relations with Washington to the "pre-Iraq" condition and, on the other hand,
either to prevent Ukrainians from coming to Iraq or, if that fails, to become the boss of the process. In any case, this
issue cannot be avoided in discussions with Russia, and any agreements reached are not likely to become public.
Like anything that the Ukrainian leaders tend to agree about with the Kremlin…
